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5IntroductionintroDuCtion
Belarus is an important European country, and, since 2004, a neighbor of the 
European Union. It has numerous historical, economic, and cultural ties with the 
peoples of the European Union. Yet we feel that Belarus, since the mid-1990’s and 
the election of Alexander Lukashenko as the country’s President, has not received 
proper attention and the appropriate place on the EU’s agenda which it indeed 
deserves.
Due to its internal domestic political circumstances, Belarus has been exclud-
ed from various European institutions and international organizations and has 
become an isolated quasi-pariah state. Belarus has become Europe’s forgotten 
country, a nation which is left out of the universally beneficial process of coopera-
tion in an increasingly prosperous and integrated Europe.
More recently, however, there is a significant increase of willingness for coop-
eration on the side of both the government in Minsk and Western governments. 
In late 2007, the Belarus Task Force was formed to help further this process with 
a thorough analysis of the situation and some specific recommendations.
The Belarus Task Force is chaired by Aleksander Kwasniewski, former Presi-
dent of Poland, and consists of a panel of highly renowned international experts 
representing a broad range of European countries. Most members of this group 
are either former Presidents or former Ministers of Foreign Affairs of their respec-
tive countries. With the following report, the Belarus Task Force hopes to draw 
more attention to the case of Belarus among a broad range of decision-makers in 
Europe as well as the United States.
An independent, democratic and open Belarus is a common European inter-
est, shared by more and more people in Belarus as well as other actors of the in-
ternational community. In order to best serve this goal, we need to promote dem-
ocratic reform in the country and to strengthen the European component of the 
Belarusian identity. We must provide Belarus with a real European alternative.
6Belarus: the winds of change?
In Belarus, a series of demonstrations and other mass events have demonstrat-
ed that there is a growing desire for change within the country, chiefly among 
the young, educated, urban elements of the population. Pressure for democratic 
change is being exerted not only by a narrow political opposition, but also by the 
broader civil society.
Although it is unlikely that the Belarusian opposition should or, indeed, could 
present a united front on all issues, it is disturbing that the Belarusian political 
opposition remains so strongly divided, with no single leader having widespread 
support within the society. There is no real dialog, let alone cooperation and coor-
dination between the political parties and the civil society and, thus, no concrete 
positive program for the country’s European development and no governing po-
tential for the time being. This is especially a cause for concern with a view to the 
parliamentary elections that took place on September 28, 2008. The Lukashenko 
regime continues to exert strong pressure on the independent media, opposi-
tion groups, and independent civil society. Human rights are not respected in 
the country. Though, for the time being, there are no internationally recognized 
political prisoners in Belarus, there are still politically motivated trials, and one 
cannot exclude the possibility of a serious relapse in connection with or following 
the elections, including resurgence in political imprisonments.
After many years of barely veiled economic support coming from Russia in the 
form of heavily subsidized natural resources and negotiations on a Union State of 
Russia and Belarus, Russia effected a decisive turn by imposing a radical price rise 
in its energy exports. The resulting energy dispute proved to be a turning point 
for Belarus. Lukashenko has become more assertive of Belarusian sovereignty – 
today, the assertion of Belarusian sovereignty seems to be the single most impor-
tant point on which the positions of Lukashenko, the Belarusian opposition and 
that of the European Union and the United States coincide.
On the one hand, in spite of the price hikes, the Russian energy supply to Be-
larus remains highly subsidized and, through exports, the net result of the price 
rise is still positive from the viewpoint of the influential elite groups. On the oth-
er hand, the prospects are even less bright for the country, especially if Russia 
continues to exert economic pressure on Belarus.
Minsk is clearly trying to reach out to the European Union, if perhaps only 
as part of a balancing act. Concessions include an agreement on the opening of 
a new European Commission Delegation in Minsk and the release of all inter-
nationally recognized political prisoners. There are signs of re-orientation and 
7opening, though Lukashenko is still strongly clinging on to power by re-shuffling 
his top officials and surrounding himself with those who are completely depend-
ent upon his rule. According to some sources, the younger generation of experts 
around Lukashenko is much more pro-European than he himself, which might 
be interpreted as a positive sign in the long run. Currently, however, power still 
belongs to the old nomenclature.
Under these circumstances, the European Union policy towards Belarus is still 
not effective: the time is now to find innovative ways to engage with Belarus. 
There are encouraging signs coming from Brussels, too, which makes a review of 
this policy by this Task Force even more appropriate.
On the strategic level, there is an increasing chance for readiness in Belarus 
to draw nearer to the European Union – this is a chance that the West must not 
let pass by. We need to focus in a much more careful, deeper, and innovative way 
than our previous tactic on what the EU can offer to Belarus in the way of in-
creased cooperation. We need to achieve the combination of a pro-European push 
coming from within Belarus, and readiness in Europe to engage with Belarus.
When doing this, the European Union should closely consult and cooperate 
with the United States. EU policy should not undermine US policy and, likewise, 
US policy has to understand and eventually support the EU policy of engagement. 
Consequently, we encourage broader and deeper cooperation between the US and 
EU policy actors who are active in Belarus.
Choosing between East and West – the false dilemma
Today, Belarus faces a false dilemma – one in which it supposedly has to choose 
between Russian economic influence and EU economic involvement. Thanks to 
the energy crises of the previous years the politically-driven nature of Russian 
economic involvement became obvious. However, European and Western invest-
ment won’t come without political conditions, either. In order to attract Western 
investment, Belarus must provide the necessary investment climate, i.e., it must 
improve the rule of law, liberalize, and privatize its economy. All these economic 
changes will lead to democratization in the long run.
Most countries of the broadly defined Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
region followed the post-‘89 logic of liberalization, democratization, and Euro-
Atlantic integration, but this does not hold true for Belarus, which still follows a 
pre-‘89, Cold War pattern. Accordingly, most Western action towards Belarus so 
8far has been overly negative rather than constructively positive. The Belarusian 
opposition is frequently criticized and described as being weak, fragmented, and 
lacking broad social support. Yet we must realize that, in the years before 1989, 
the opposition was in no better shape in many of the by-now successful CEE tran-
sition countries than in today’s Belarus. It is difficult for a strong and united op-
position to develop if the circumstances do not allow for it.
The process of transition will need a strong opposition and civil society which 
could mobilize broader social support for change and, thereby, could provide a 
catalyst for a more European orientation. The key question today is how to make 
the Lukashenko administration, or at least a ‘critical mass’ of the officials and 
leaders within that administration, interested in a Western orientation and thus, 
in the provision of the increased room for democracy that goes hand-in-hand 
with it. The experience of the CEE countries shows that such openings may hap-
pen if there is a split within the administration, with soft-liners successfully ad-
vocating change, and hard-liners (typically the inner circle, law enforcement and 
security apparatus) understanding that they have no other option than to trans-
form. We firmly believe that such a European orientation is the only long-term 
guarantee for Belarusian sovereignty. The remaining question is how to convince 
Lukashenko’s government of this. Isolation and sanctions are certainly not the 
right tools to do that. Any approach should be complemented by a policy of en-
gagement.
9Our vision for belarusour vision for BElArus
The possibilities for a democratic change
Although we recognize that the current administration has significant internal 
support, we believe that the overall situation requires significant changes, keep-
ing in mind that, at the same time, a feeling of dissatisfaction with the same gov-
ernment is growing. 
Democracy cannot be imposed from the outside and no such efforts have had 
long-standing, sustainable positive results. Democracy can only develop in the 
minds of the people. The outside world can only help provide some necessary con-
ditions, e.g., to stop repression, to ensure the rule of law, the freedom of speech etc. 
The Belarusian political opposition is generally weak and seriously divided. 
In addition to this, though opposition forces have a significant number of pas-
sive supporters, they are very weakly organized and are disconnected from large 
parts of the society. At this point the opposition does not have the capacity for 
carrying out a systemic change, and is not yet ready to take the lead in the 
transition process.
Therefore, the process of a peaceful transition can only be realistically imag-
ined through a dialog with the current administration, as was also suggested by 
certain groups of the Belarusian opposition almost a year ago. In parallel with 
this, the rights of the opposition have to be ensured. In this process the experi-
ence of Central and Eastern European countries could prove to be very use-
ful. Consequently, rather than some sort of revolution, a negotiated, peaceful 
transition seems to be a more realistic option.
A peaceful transition at this point would require the active participation of 
at least a portion of the current elite, as the opposition has neither a suitable can-
didate nor the power necessary to play a significant role in the transition process, 
at least not in the near future. The emergence of a political leader is still necessary, 
who could be acceptable for both sides, as happened in many of the transitions of 
the Central- and Eastern European countries. This compromise could be the first 
step on the road of peaceful transition leading to fully democratic elections.
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Dialog with Minsk 
While keeping in mind that the Lukashenko administration is the only ‘available’ 
negotiating partner, the Belarus Task Force intends to draw attention to certain 
peculiarities of negotiation with it.
First, during his long career Alexander Lukashenko has proved many times 
that he must not be underestimated. He is a rather pragmatic, cunning politi-
cian. Although Lukashenko cannot be considered a ‘reliable’ negotiation partner 
in our perception, understanding his goals and political objectives would result in 
the ability to predict his moves to a certain extent – namely, along with his own 
interests.
The administration is neither homogenous nor monolithic. Lukashenko alone 
cannot sustain his rule; the support of the elite around him is inevitable. These 
groups have a number of competing – mostly economic – interests and all aspire 
for key positions in the management of the most profitable companies. Under 
these circumstances, Lukashenko constantly needs to juggle and balance these 
elite groups and play them off against each other.
Lukashenko cannot show the slightest sign of weakness, as this would en-
danger his own position. Therefore, he will react positively only to demands which 
either do not expect him to accept the blame or those which provide him with an 
opportunity to ‘save face.’
That being said, the various parts of the current opposition, both political par-
ties, and civil society must be part of the process. No real progress is possible 
without their consent and active participation in the entire process. In addition 
to this, a lot needs to be done in order to build a certain non-political strata of 
the Belarusian society as well, most importantly the entrepreneurs and mid-level 
professional officials, the so-called ‘chinovniki’.
A gradual and conditional approach
This also implies that no radical changes can be expected from President Lukash-
enko. At this point he is capable of conducting only small, gradual moves – the 
complexity of the elite groups around him allows only such a smooth and care-
ful approach. Slow action provides him with the time necessary for maneuvering 
among the various elite groups.
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Moreover, partly due to the abovementioned reasons, and partly due to his 
own mindset, a pragmatic way of engagement with the Belarusian government 
– that Lukashenko would also be able to respond to – is rather a purely negative-
conditionality-based approach. It has to be made clear that this conditionality 
works in the reverse as well: for any step back, it is an illusion not to expect a 
negative reaction from the EU – which can either be a concrete, active measure, or 
simply a failure to grant a promised benefit. With suspending the visa-ban against 
most Belarusian leaders on 13th October for an initial 6-months period, the EU 
made the first step towards establishing such a conditionality-based engagement: 
the decision includes the possibility of re-installing the travel restrictions at any 
earlier time, should the government conduct improper, anti-democratic actions.
Russia has a major influence on Belarusian economic and cultural life; there-
fore, in the EU-Belarus relationship, Russia indeed has a special place. A group 
of ’Friends of Belarusian Transition’ could create a common forum for problem-
solving-oriented debate, as well as for building trust between the governments.
Being determined but careful
The recent positive steps of the Belarusian government induced a spectacular, 
supportive answer from the EU. The meeting of Belarusian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sergey Martynov and Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikor-
ski, and especially the invitation of Martynov to a European Commission meeting 
show not only the readiness for a change on the side of the EU, but the echoes of 
this are very positive on the side of Minsk as well.
However, the elections on 28 September were conducted basically in the same 
anti-democratic way as the previous ones had been. The government used less 
obvious methods in coloring the election’s results on this occasion, but their 
methods still clearly fell short of democratic standards, as the OSCE report 
documents.
One can argue that the strong dividing lines among the opposition groups 
also contributed to the failure of the democratic candidates – e.g. they really did 
not receive enough votes – but this does not change the fact, that the general 
environment of the elections was not democratic at all. Media access was un-
balanced, there was no room for a lively election campaign, representatives of the 
democratic opposition were not allowed to participate in electoral committees, 
the Belarusian method of ‘early voting’ brought into question the fairness of the 
election, and, most importantly, the vote-counting process was not transparent.
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At the same time, we would like to warn everyone against overestimating the 
importance of the recent parliamentary elections. In the Belarusian constitu-
tional system the parliament has only very limited powers. As long as this is 
unchanged, the parliament will remain only of symbolic importance - regardless 
of whether or not it includes representatives of the opposition. Consequently, 
there is no need to over-dramatize the clearly negative results of the recent 
elections – the democratization of Belarus does not depend on the parlia-
ment, but on the will of the president and on the elite groups around him. 
Thus, despite the failed expectation, we still advise continuation of the sup-
portive, more active EU approach, simply because, for Lukashenko’s adminis-
tration, the only alternative to the increasingly pro-European orientation is 
Russia. The current ‘in-between’, balancing act position of Minsk is less and 
less sustainable. Consequently, the EU needs to keep providing an attractive al-
ternative – or at least show readiness to do so.
Besides the already mentioned decision on temporarily suspending the visa 
ban, there seem to be other signs of further engagement emerging from the side 
of the EU: the European Parliament on 9th October not only expressed its sup-
port towards visa ban decision, but also suggested the decrease of visa prices to-
wards ordinary Belarusians.
However, is still extremely important to be cautious. It has to be kept in mind 
that the EU has a much slower reaction time than the government in Minsk, 
which is clearly monolithic at least when compared to the EU - in other words, 
an anti-democratic relapse can happen much faster than the EU could even react. 
Conditionality must be reflected in every single step of the negotiating process.
The Role of Ukraine as a mediator
Ukraine is in a good political and geographical position for being a media-
tor in EU-Belarus negotiations. As it is a member of neither the EU nor NATO, 
Ukraine is much more acceptable as a ‘neutral’ mediator for Belarus than an EU 
(and especially NATO) member state. Ukraine could also be a suitable venue for 
meetings between EU and US politicians and high-ranking Belarusian officials 
without violating the visa ban, should the list be expanded again in the future. 
Ukraine’s current political crisis, however, largely inhibits its political ability to 
act as a mediator on the scene of international politics – a satisfactory resolution 
of this crisis seems to be a necessary pre-condition of fulfilling such a mediating 
role.
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An EU Special Representative for Belarus
The European Union should pay much more attention to Belarus and keep it con-
stantly on its political agenda. We think that the appointment of an EU Special 
Representative for Belarus would be of great importance, especially if the current 
positive steps of the Lukashenko administration are continued. This would not 
only signal the increased and continuous interest of the EU towards Belarus, but 
also offer a permanent channel for dialog with both the opposition and the gov-
ernment. A EUSR would also be able to coordinate different efforts much more 
effectively.
The visa ban list
Concerning the visa ban list, experience shows that despite the initial skepticism, 
the visa ban list proved to be an effective bargaining tool in negotiation with 
the Belarusian government. The EU’s recent decision to reduce the visa ban list to 
only a handful of names drew much attention, and was a very clear signal to the 
Belarusian government of the willingness to improve relations.
However, it should be made clear for the Lukashenko administration that the 
visa ban list is a flexible one – in both ways. In the event of satisfactory coop-
eration it is possible to remove certain names, perhaps even some of the high-
ranking ones. On the other hand, in a case of continued non-compliance, further 
names could be added, even hundreds of them, if necessary.
More concrete EU demands
Most experts agree that instead of the 12 general demands in the EU ‘non-paper’, 
a shorter, and–, most importantly –, more concrete list of demands should be 
prepared and should also be constantly updated. It could be not only more easily 
interpreted by both the government and the opposition, but could also support 
the further development of the abovementioned idea of a gradual and conditional 
approach.
The need for a detailed EU-Belarus Road Map can be logically derived from the 
necessity of the conditionality-based approach. Such a road map needs to contain 
a detailed list of steps expected to be done by the Lukashenko administration, 
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and the benefits from the side of the EU for fulfilling these demands in order to 
clearly set the guidelines of the future, intensifying engagement.
The EU-Belarus Road Map needs to be elaborated with the highest urgency, in 
order to provide a viable, concrete and convincing alternative for Belarus against 
the growing pressure of Russia. Besides the EU and national governments, ex-
perts communities and the NGO sector needs to get involved in the preparation 
of the road map, both from the EU Member States and from Belarus.
Support for democratic opposition
The Belarusian opposition is marginalized because of state repression of opposi-
tion activists and the systematic destruction of any oppositional structure, as well 
as of communication channels to the population. In addition to external repres-
sion, internal mistakes and weaknesses have further hindered the development 
of a strong opposition. The opposition has put in too much effort to reach out 
to its own followers in the opposition community and to the international com-
munity, while at the same time losing contact with the population in general, 
since too few efforts were made to communicate effectively with the people. Also 
the obvious - and understandable - dependency of many Belarusian opposition 
groups and parties on foreign donors has further alienated the parties from the 
local population. Moreover, this has accelerated internal conflicts and lowered the 
public image of party leaders and their rank and file members.
The Belarusian opposition has relied so much on foreign aid that they have not 
developed their own strength to withstand the repression, but instead pinned 
their hopes too much on foreign help. Albeit Western institutions and civil soci-
ety play an important role in alleviating the harm and protecting oppositional ac-
tivists, they do not (and cannot) prevent the marginalization of the opposition. 
To some extent, foreign aid has simply helped the opposition to accommodate 
itself in the marginal niche which Lukashenko has allowed for it.
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Reaching out to the people
To strengthen the opposition in Belarus, the opposition must be enabled and en-
couraged to revitalize effective communication with the mass of the people reach-
ing out beyond the small opposition circles. As the recent election campaign has 
shown, thousands of citizens are willing to sign for their candidates. The political 
base of the opposition can be strengthened and further developed once the op-
position begins to work on the concrete needs of their electorate and engages 
itself in the multitude of small struggles of the citizens with state institutions. 
The EU should help the opposition to develop the necessary capacities and should 
encourage outreach to new groups of the citizenry. Opposition actors who are 
especially successful at connecting with the population (as can be seen from opin-
ion polls) should be rewarded.
Networks instead of coalition
From the first coalition building exercise for the presidential elections in 2001, 
the political diversity within the Belarusian opposition has been put aside for 
the single overwhelming issue of democratization. Since then, the differences 
between many opposition parties are widely reduced to questions of (life)-style 
and party-history. Instead of ’forcing’ the opposition into internal quarrels over 
leadership in artificial coalitions and instead of barring independent actors out 
of the coalition, as donors have sometimes done in the past, the EU (and the 
USA) should foster cooperation and networking between the different groups. 
This should also lead to an opening of the ’opposition block’ towards new allies 
within broader Belarusian society.
Strengthen self-defense
While under pressure, the opposition and independent groups are not helpless 
against state repression. In many cases, rights defenders within Belarus can de-
velop leverage since (a) Belarusian state institutions do not form a monolithic 
bloc, but are ridden by internal factions and power struggles that could be mobi-
lized against each other. In addition to this, (b) Lukashenko’s government reacts 
sensibly to shifts in the public mood, since major trends cannot be marginalized 
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as being ’just the usual opposition’, and (c) the population has been taught to 
mistrust the state bureaucracy by Lukashenko himself who regularly dismisses 
his former co-workers and still tries to present himself as a fighter in the struggle 
against corruption.
The opposition needs, therefore, to develop much stronger capacities to de-
fend their rights within the country and to involve the broad population in local 
struggles and issues. Human rights groups should be trained not just to monitor 
and report human rights offenses, but to become human rights defenders.
Unfortunately though, the EU until now has not systematically strengthened 
the work of human rights defenders within Belarus, and has instead relied mainly 
on external interventions through the channels of foreign diplomacy, which have 
proved to be utterly ineffective in influencing the regime.
The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) for 
2007-2013 has put an emphasis on support for human rights defenders and 
should be regarded as a first step in the right direction, but the amount of sup-
port projected for Belarus up to now is absolutely insufficient, especially when 
compared to the amounts spent over the last years for, e.g. student programs.
Developing partnership between donors and opposition actors
The opposition in Belarus has to be supported and should not be left alone against 
the state apparatus, but the effects of the dependency of opposition groups and 
parties on foreign aid must be reduced. This does not mean that the level of sup-
port should be reduced. On the contrary: while increasing the support for the 
opposition their independence should also be increased. The EU donors and their 
intermediaries should, therefore, constrain their level of intervention and avoid 
direct involvement in political decisions and strategies. Outsiders, especially rep-
resentatives of large state-financed programs, have to stay within the boundaries 
of facilitating democratic processes and should not become ’pure actors’ in the 
internal democratic process.
The EU should make their support to opposition groups as transparent as pos-
sible, but without endangering the local partners who often have to protect them-
selves against prosecution from the Belarusian secret services and other ’law en-
forcement agencies’.
The EU has to publicly strengthen its measures against fraud and mismanage-
ment of political aid. Not because this is taking place on a larger scale, but because 
the opposition is constantly blamed for it. In-country capacities for the monitor-
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ing of projects, in particular, have to be increased in order to catch misconduct 
early and efficiently before public damage have been done. Thereby the assess-
ment of impact should play a greater role than in the past, even as it is understood 
that the political risks in Belarus are immense.
Bringing the opposition, society, and the government to the 
negotiation table
As was stated before, negotiations with the government must be organized to-
gether with the opposition, civil society, and – if possible – entrepreneurs as well 
as mid-level professional officials. Rounds of negotiations must, therefore, not 
only involve foreign delegations, but should also include public participation. 
While the official focus of public roundtables, creative contests, future conferenc-
es, Open Spaces etc. would be the participation of society, the opposition must be 
’naturally’ taken along and allowed to participate too.
The negative outcome of the elections does not change the general importance 
of participating and demonstrating the country-wide presence of the democratic 
opposition. After the parliamentary elections ended with the general defeat of 
the democratic opposition candidates, the next strategic objective is to start pre-
paring for the next local and presidential elections, both scheduled to take place 
in 2011. At the same time, the training and education programs aimed at Belaru-
sian youth need to be continued and strengthened. Because younger generations 
always have a more open mindset than their predecessors, demography indeed 
works for democracy.
Support for civil society
The support given by Western NGOs and other organizations plays a crucial role 
in preserving Belarusian civil society, despite the restrictive policies of the gov-
ernment. However, in order to not only maintain the existing contacts and or-
ganizations, but to further develop Belarusian civil society, certain modifications 
should be considered.
First, the overall grant policy of the European Union needs to incorporate 
more flexibility and to reduce bureaucracy. In the current state the necessary 
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administration far exceeds the capability of many Belarusian civil organizations, 
not to mention the long period between submitting an application and actually 
receiving the grant. Another issue is that, in many cases, NGOs can apply only for 
the reimbursement of money they’ve already spent. Such a system is not suitable 
for newly founded organizations, and especially not for non-registered ones.
Another related problem is that EU grants can be given by definition only to 
registered organizations possessing legal entity – something quite hard to achieve 
in Belarus. The new EU calls for proposals under which organizations registered 
outside Belarus are eligible, are good examples for a more effective and flexible 
approach, but are still not sufficient.
In addition to maintaining support for the ‘traditional’ opposition organiza-
tions, more attention should be paid to informal groups on the grassroots level. 
In many cases they possess real action potential (especially on local levels), have 
active and devoted members, and are young, agile, and creative. The practically 
impossible acquisition of registered legal status should not deprive them of re-
ceiving EU funding. 
Funding should be continued because in most cases European support has a 
cyclical nature: it is provided in the run-up to and after the elections or if atroci-
ties have happened. A solid base funding that continuously flows would be most 
welcome. In many cases long term programs with a 3-5 year perspective are re-
quired, which then should be assessed regularly so that the money flow can be 
directly reduced if a strategy does not bear results (or increased, if opportunities 
arise).
Another almost neglected group consists of the trade unions, which need 
more attention and support. The GSP preferences were suspended in June 2007 
in connection with Belarusian non-compliance with the ILO recommendation 
concerning the rights of the trade unions. Therefore, the trade unions have a 
strong external supporter behind them, namely the ILO. If liberalization of the 
operating conditions of the trade unions could be achieved, along with the re-
granting of GSP preferences, this would have an additional effect on the over-
all democratization process by its positive spill-over into the non-governmental 
sphere.
Therefore, in the long run, a more flexible policy of civil society support should 
be elaborated. As long as no such policy exists, the role of intermediaries should 
be increased in supporting Belarusian civil society. EU funds should be given 
to those European organizations (both national and international ones) which 
already have significant experience and routine in working with the Belarusian 
civic sphere. These intermediary organizations could then channel EU funds to 
Belarus more effectively by using their own more flexible financial rules. Obvi-
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ously, maximum accountability of the intermediary organizations has to be en-
sured. The experience of the CEE countries is an important contribution to the 
improvement of the funding process.
It is also essential to be able to offer financial support to political parties. While 
donors have good reasons not to support political parties, it must be understood 
that there is no democracy without an effective multi-party system and –under 
the current circumstances – supporting the creation and development of political 
parties is as important as support for civil society. Continuity of funding is espe-
cially important in this case, although in the periods before elections additional 
financial support is still needed.
So far, unfortunately, Western engagement in transforming the sphere of 
education in Belarus has had little success. In the meantime, authorities have 
established full ideological control over the educational system. Students and 
teachers find themselves under constant pressure and harassment. Belarus re-
mains the only country in Europe not participating in the Bologna process. The 
European Humanities University, established in Minsk in 1992 to promote values 
of Western civilization, was accused of active international cooperation and bru-
tally closed in 2004.
Bringing non-censored information to Belarus
One of the main elements of the still existing popularity of the Lukashenko gov-
ernment is the almost complete governmental control over the Belarusian me-
dia. All television channels and radio broadcasts are under state control, while 
most of the independent journals and newspapers have either been shut down, or 
their journalists have been harassed or arrested. Interestingly enough, due to the 
availability of Russian channels and the large number of satellite receivers owned 
by households, information on the world is accessible from many sources. What 
is missing is information on Belarus – in this field the government exercises 
complete control.
The newly approved presidential bill of June 24, 2008 throws the state of the 
Belarusian media back to Soviet times by cracking down on internet journalism in 
Belarus and forbidding Belarusian media to accept foreign funding. By requiring 
registration for all Belarusian internet sites and making it possible to persecute 
journalists for ‘discrediting Belarus’, the informational hunger of Belarus towards 
sources of media coming from inside of Belarus will significantly increase.
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Therefore it is of great importance to break the information monopoly of the 
regime, and to deliver independent, non-censored information to the Belarusian 
people. This would be the most effective way of supporting the pro-European part 
of their identity in order to bring them closer to Europe. 
There have been numerous efforts to launch independent media channels 
to provide an alternative to the state-monopolized information services. How-
ever, the coordination among Western alternative media channels needs to 
be improved. Currently some of these channels are competing rather than co-
operating, especially concerning broadcast hours, frequency distribution, etc. In 
addition to this, they are competing basically for the same national and EU-level 
financial resources, what also hinders efficiency. Another area to be improved is 
their broadcast range inside the country, so that more people could be reached 
by the broadcasts.
Besides better coordination of Western alternative media channels, more em-
phasis should be put on the support of electronic, internet-based media. In 
Belarus, the rate of internet access is surprisingly high and is dynamically grow-
ing: currently, it is on par with that of Austria. Experience shows that the internet 
is not only a way of providing information, but it can also function as a mobiliza-
tion and activization tool. 
Setting up a well-functioning network of Western alternative media channels 
would be the most effective way to convince ordinary Belarusian people of the 
long-term positive effect of democratic transition. A credible alternative needs 
to be provided to the undoubtedly existing and clearly foreseeable short-term 
hindrances, which tend to be emphasized by official communications in order to 
maintain the overall apathy and skepticism of the people.
While the coordination of the Western media seems to be most urgent, it 
must not be overlooked that within the country independent print and internet 
media still exist, which need support and protection. Besides this, the state me-
dia should be targeted with programs to encourage the professional development 
and exchange of journalists, as well as a more balanced coverage of the EU and 
democratic processes in other countries.
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Improving the human rights situation
According to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in Belarus, the deterioration of human rights in Belarus has been dramatic 
due to the rejection of pluralism in all sectors of society, the denial of civil rights, 
and repression of political freedoms.
It has to be made clear to the Lukashenko regime that improving the human 
rights situation in Belarus is a prerequisite of getting any significant benefits 
from the EU. However, instead of always only promising general ‘benefits’, more 
concrete promises are needed from the EU.
First and foremost, although the regime has released all political prisoners, 
the immediate ending of politically motivated trials should be demanded. In 
addition, the government of Belarus must put an end to all arbitrary deten-
tions, including the less visible cases in smaller cities, mostly against low-level 
opposition activists.
If a moratorium on the death penalty were introduced in Belarus, an impor-
tant obstacle to Belarusian membership in the Council of Europe would be re-
moved, as currently Belarus is the only European country which is not a member 
of the organization. However, it has to be kept in mind that CoE membership has 
numerous other requirements besides the abolition of the death penalty – thus 
no irresponsible promises on an easy Belarusian accession should be made.
In addition to these, the immediate cessation of harassment of both opposi-
tion movements and individuals should be demanded. The regime has to realize 
that actions taken against even low-level opposition activists in the countryside 
will not remain unnoticed, and that such moves could result in a serious delay of 
any support offered by the EU. In order to achieve that, more EU effort should be 
taken to provide these cases with more publicity, e.g. through embassies in Bela-
rus. Publicizing can sometimes be more effective than high-level, narrow-focused 
political demands. This would also give an image of coherence to the EU’s policy 
towards Belarus.
Respect for Human Rights in Europe means today also respect for national 
minorities and their right to self-organization and participation in public 
life. European standards on national minorities, deriving from the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27), the United Nations Declara-
tion on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Lin-
guistic Minorities, two Council of Europe treaties (the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages, and the OSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990 have to 
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be observed and implemented in practice. The last years have witnessed many 
examples of various repressions towards national minority organizations, 
including efforts to influence the outcome of elections and the structure and 
representation of national minority organizations. This remains an important 
dividing factor in relations with some EU neighbors of Belarus. Thus, the Be-
larusian administration has had to cease its efforts to interfere with the activities 
of independent organizations of national minorities; in fact the role of a public 
administration –in Belarus - should be support for minorities in strengthening 
their rights stemming from the above mentioned legal acts and other European 
standards and regulations. The progress on these issues should be closely ob-
served by EU institutions, since respect for minority rights remains one of the 
most important principles of an integrated Europe.   
As argued above, special emphasis should be placed on capacity-building 
for Belarusian human rights defenders.
Broader economic cooperation
It is well known that the Lukashenko government faces serious economic hard-
ships, mostly due to increasing Russian energy prices and their related conse-
quences. In order to counter-balance these negative effects, Belarus is trying to 
make a gradual economic opening towards the West, though still is not conduct-
ing any significant political reforms.
Belarus has some reason for being optimistic about this effort, as there is 
already a significant presence of European companies in the country, which 
remains mostly unnoticed both by the Western political and scientific spheres. 
However, their presence in Belarus already represents a certain localization ten-
dency, as they want to have their interests represented and protected. The gov-
ernment responds to these demands, which was clearly shown by the recent abo-
lition of the ’golden share rule’, a law which permitted the government to take 
over the control of any companies in which the state had even the smallest share. 
Increased protection for private investment in the form of internal legislation 
and international treaties should also be encouraged.
Even so, the existing European business involvement in Belarus should be ex-
plored and analyzed by researchers in order to have a deeper analysis and a bet-
ter estimation on the chance of success for Lukashenko’s efforts at an economic 
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opening. The West could also lean on the European business presence in Bela-
rus as a possible driver for future change.
Therefore, further European business involvement in Belarus should be 
encouraged. In addition to the abovementioned motivations, there is another 
important reason for this. Namely, since the Lukashenko government desper-
ately needs foreign capital, the alternative of getting it from Europe is to attract 
further Russian (or possibly Chinese) investors.
There are also a number of programs on cross-border cooperation which do al-
ready facilitate economic ties to the West, mostly to the Baltic States and Poland. 
These programs contribute to the socio-economic development of the region by 
supporting small businesses, improving transport infrastructure, and protecting 
the common cultural and environmental heritage. Many of them are also designed 
to improve the human rights situation in Belarus, such as the UN programs for 
combating trafficking in drugs and human beings.
All in all, we have to realize that preventing the economic collapse of Belarus 
is of essential importance for Europe. Protecting the existing European business 
interests is only part of the problem. Of similar importance is the increasing Rus-
sian economic influence, which does not facilitate the economic reforms that are 
so important for providing a background for a democratic transition and the eco-
nomic cooperation between the EU and Belarus. Therefore, assisting the pres-
ervation of the economic stability of Belarus is a crucial Western interest. In 
order to achieve this state, significant economic reforms need to be made – the 
commitment of the EU will provide important motivation to the authorities.
The main problem areas which need to undergo reforms are strongly related 
both to the state and the economic sector, e.g., fighting corruption, lowering the 
cost of doing business, and increasing investor protection would all result in a 
better economic environment. However, the most important issue remains the 
high volume of foreign debt, which could subject the country to swings in finan-
cial markets and lead to economic collapse.
A smart visa policy
The bureaucratic complications and expenses related to the acquisition of EU vi-
sas have long been a concern for the Belarusian people. The introduction of the 
Schengen visa system in all three countries neighboring Belarus from the West 
– i.e., Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – has made the situation worse. The 60 EUR 
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price of a single entry visa equals approximately one-third of the average 
monthly salary in Belarus. In addition to this, the process itself has become even 
more complicated and time-consuming. 
Moreover, the introduction of the Schengen system almost immediately in-
duced the ‘black market trade’ of Schengen visas and more people have turned 
to organized crime groups in order to get ‘smuggled’ into the EU.
The European Union should consider the development of a new, smart – more 
flexible, more demand-oriented – visa policy for Belarus, which would allow or-
dinary Belarusian citizens to work, study, and travel in the European Union, thus 
contributing to the overall improvement of the EU’s image in Belarus and help to 
not alienate them from Europe any further. At the same time, thanks to its flex-
ibility, a smart visa policy could remain an effective political leverage tool towards 
members of the government. 
A smart visa policy should contain the following elements:
Visa fees for Belarusian people should be decreased•	  generally. In the long 
run, even an EU-Belarus visa facilitation agreement could be offered, pro-
vided that the Belarusian government fulfils certain requirements set by the 
EU. Until then, unilateral steps from the EU could achieve important results 
as well.
More exceptions need to be allowed•	 . A reasonable selection criterion could 
be the purpose of the visit: for students, scientific delegations and exchange 
programs, decreased visa fees should be introduced. In certain well-grounded 
cases, even granting free visas could be considered. Another option is to intro-
duce an age-based simplification, for example for people below 25 and over 60 
years, the visa price could be decreased. 
The institution of the so-called •	 ‘national visa’ should be used more frequent-
ly, especially in the case of those people who need to visit the given country 
regularly and for a relatively long time. 
The example of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements with the 
Western Balkan Countries, within the framework of which the visa fee was low-
ered to 35 EUR, some groups of applicants were granted free of charge admis-
sion, visa procedures were simplified, shows how Serbian people, for instance, 
benefited from a similar situation.
In order to shorten the time necessary for acquiring a Schengen visa, the EU 
member states should consider increasing the number of consular personnel, 
i.e., local workforce contracted for consular jobs, working at their embassies and 
consulates. Such a step would not diminish the overall security of the Schengen 
system, and it would result in much faster administration.
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Transatlantic cooperation
Due to its more unified policy-making structures, the United States is capable 
of a much more effective use of sanctions and various punitive measures than 
the European Union. The recent steps of Washington putting all Belarusian oil 
companies under sanctions and flexibly reacting to positive changes by easing 
them perfectly illustrates this action potential. The release of political prisoners 
shows that sanctions, if applied intelligently, can bring serious results.
As was stated before, the current macroeconomic situation of Belarus does not 
allow the Lukashenko administration to further spoil its relations with both the 
US and the EU. Improving Western economic ties is a must for the government, 
and foreign trade incomes need to be increased. Taking into account this desire 
of the government and the recent measures of the US, the EU has been able to 
improve its negotiating potential by emphasizing its own flexibility, readiness 
for negotiations, and its more positive approach towards Belarus, to credibly 
complement US sanctions and to counterbalance Russian influence as well. 
Obviously such a policy needs to be conducted in a coordinated way, e.g., not 
against the intentions of Washington, but by acting together, keeping the same ob-
jectives in mind, and using different, yet complementary methods. For example, 
further sanctions introduced by Washington could be complemented by further 
cooperation offers from the side of the EU – delivered together with further de-
mands. Belarus is not strong enough anymore to reject or resist both offers, as 
the third pole – Russia – is not a viable option as long as the Lukashenko adminis-
tration intends to decrease its dependency on Moscow. In such a way, Belarus will 
be more responsive to the European offer – and hopefully fulfill demands which 
are in the interest of both the EU and the US.
The strategic goals of the US and the EU to be achieved, e.g., having a stable, 
democratic Belarus, are the same, and an even more coordinated transatlantic 
approach can be all the more useful in achieving them.
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RecommendationsrECoMMEnDAtions
Dialog with Minsk applying a gradual and conditional 
approach
Engagement with the regime is necessary for achieving change in Belarus. The 
effectiveness of negotiations could be raised by involving Ukraine as a mediator. 
Conditionality should be observed at all steps of the negotiating process, using 
tools such as a flexible visa ban list.
Appointment of an EU Special Representative for Belarus
The European Union should pay much more attention to Belarus and keep it con-
stantly on its political agenda. The appointment of a EUSR for Belarus would be 
of great importance. This would not only signal the increased and continuous 
interest of the EU towards Belarus, but it would also offer a permanent channel 
for dialog with both the opposition and the government. A EUSR would also be 
able to coordinate different efforts much more effectively.
Support for the democratic opposition
In order to overcome the marginalization of the opposition, the outreach to the 
broader public and a stronger involvement of the society in opposition struggles 
and vice versa should be encouraged. More diversity in between presidential elec-
tion campaigns and a reduction in dependency on international donors shall em-
power the opposition to form a broader political base.
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Support for civil society
In the long run, a more flexible civil society support policy should be applied, the 
coordination among donors should be improved, and experienced intermediaries 
on the national and international level should get an increased role. Adapting 
experience from organizations of Central- and Eastern Europe would facilitate 
this process. Coordinated efforts of EU member states and foundations should 
be undertaken to support activities of the European Humanities University cur-
rently located in Vilnius, Lithuania, which remains the only Belarusian university 
providing free education for the young generation of students of Belarus.
Bring non-censored information to Belarus
The coordination among the already existing media needs to be improved, as well 
as their range inside the country. Support of electronic, internet-based media 
should be increased as well.
Improvement of the human rights situation
Parallel to demands of improving the overall human rights situation in Belarus – 
and with special regard to the situation of the opposition, more publicity should 
follow the events in Belarus and local rights defenders must be supported.
Encouraging Western economic involvement
Realizing that the economic stability of Belarus is also in the interest of the EU, 
further economic involvement of European business should be encouraged. The 
analysis and exploration of existing economic ties between Belarus and the EU 
should serve as a first step for more involvement in the future.
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Smart visa policy
A general reduction of visa fees, consideration of offering an EU-Belarus visa •	
facilitation agreement.
Allowance of more exceptions to the visa fees.•	
More frequent use of the so-called ‘national visa’.•	
Increasing the number of consular personnel.•	
Improvement of transatlantic cooperation
Harmonizing the different approaches of the United States and the European Un-
ion towards Belarus would lead to a result much more effectively. The EU should 
realize and play upon its special position and possibilities, and this – in parallel to 
the stricter Belarus policy of the US – would properly serve the common transat-
lantic goal.
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Due to its internal domestic political circumstances, Belarus has been excluded 
from various European institutions and international organizations and has 
become an isolated quasi-pariah state. Belarus has become Europe’s forgotten 
country, a nation which is left out of the universally beneficial process of coop-
eration in an increasingly prosperous and integrated Europe.
More recently, however, there is a significant increase of willingness for coopera-
tion on the side of both the government in Minsk and Western governments. In 
late 2007, the Belarus Task Force was formed to help further this process with 
a thorough analysis of the situation and some specific recommendations. is 
report contains a summary of the group’s views and analysis.
e International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) is a non-profit or-
ganization based in Budapest, which collects the experiences of past democratic 
transitions and shares them with those who are determined to follow that path. 
Instead of promoting democracy in general, the ICDT sets more concrete and 
pragmatic goals, concentrating on democratic transition as a process. e Centre 
strives to show how dozens of young democracies have made and are making the 
transition, so that th se who set off on this difficult journey from dictatorship to 
democracy in the future may learn from the successes as well as the failures.
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